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PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: 
EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA 




 It is a widely held opinion that the resumption of growth in Africa 
will require, among other things, an increase in investment, which 
will have to come primarily from the private sector if growth is to be 
efficient and sustained. Using a simple neoclassical investment 
model, we examined the impact of political instability on private 
investment. The OLS estimates indicate that political instability does 
not have any significant direct impact on private investment. We 
recommend that a political framework that does not negatively affect 
aggregate spending will be favourable to private investment boom. 





     It is a widely held opinion that the resumption of growth in Africa 
will require, among other things, an increase in investment, which 
will have to come primarily from the private sector if growth is to be 
efficient and sustained (Khan and Reinhart 1990). However, recent 
theoretical and empirical studies tend to suggest that reviving private 
investment may proof difficult unless concerted efforts are made 
towards restoring consistency and stability in macroeconomic policy 
environment of business (see Pindyck 1991; Metcalf and Rosenthal, 
1995 among several writers who have brilliantly discuss these 
issues). One major source of macroeconomic policy instability is 
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political instability/uncertainty. Political instability is defined in 
different ways depending on the indices that lend themselves to 
empirical analysis. For empirical purposes political proxies may not 
be adequately distinguished from expectations about movements in 
some macroeconomic aggregates such as exchange rate. But this is 
seen as too narrow a conceptualisation of the role of politics if one 
sees it as "the presence of conflict between objectives of investors 
and governments" (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1993). 
 
     Studies generally seek to capture the impact of discrete political 
events rather than the political stability of the system over the long 
run. This is because the development of political proxies to aid 
economic research is notoriously difficult. Political indices are by 
their very nature qualitative and their use in (regression) analyses is 
perhaps more valid with respect to their sign rather than to the 
magnitude of the coefficients. The discrete political events usually 
focused on include government instability (revolutions and coups), 
rapid government turn over, unstable incentive frameworks, social 
unrest, fundamental uncertainties about property rights, political 
assassinations and executions, election crisis and violence, etc. (see, 
for instance, Brunetti and Weder 1997). 
 
     The  object  of  this  study  is  to examine the impact of political 
instability, using some selected indices, on the behaviour of private 
investment in Nigeria. The rest of the study is arranged as follows. 
Section 2 dwells on the behaviour of private investment in Nigeria 
since 1960. The literature on private investment is discussed in 
section 3. A core model of private investment is presented in section 
4. An extended model to capture political instability is estimated and 
discussed in section 5. The study is concluded in section 6. 
 
2. Investment Behaviour in Nigeria. 
 
     At the end of 1960, gross capital formation (GCF) in Nigeria stood 
at 258.2 million Naira of which the private sector accounted for 135.2 
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million Naira or about 52.0 per cent of total GCF
1. By 1963, out of the 
total GCF of 354 million Naira, the private sector accounted for about 
227.2 million Naira or 64.0 percent of total. Within this time frame, 
the role of the public sector in economic activity was minimal. This 
was a carry over effect of the colonial era where the government 
concentrated more on governance and security. Real GDP which 
stood at 1962.6 million Naira in 1960 rose to 2243.0 million Naira in 
1963 which represents an increase of over 14.0 percent. Over the 
years, a key factor to the erratic economic performance of the 
Nigerian economy had been the behaviour of aggregate investment 
expenditures (see survey by Uchendu, 1993). In the early 1970s, the 
positive external shocks in the form of increased oil prices generated 
massive savings and created investment booms (Ikhide, 1994). 
Investment expenditure when measured in current prices increased at 
an annual average rate of 55.0 percent between 1970 and 1975.  
 
     In the 1960s the government encouraged domestic banks to give a 
larger proportion of their domestic credit to domestic firms. Hitherto, 
credit to firms was largely externally financed. It was in 1963 that 
the government itself expanded rapidly its domestic credit. Between 
1963 and 1966, nominal GDP rose from 2745.8 million Naira (1963) 
to 3374.8 million Naira (1966), while real GDP rose from 2825.6 
million Naira to 3044.8 million Naira (at 1962 factor cost). The 
evidence shows that real GDP grew by about 8.0 percent between 
1960 and 1966 while total GCF rose from 354 million Naira in 1963 
to 485.2 million Naira in 1966. The share of the private sector moved 
from 64 per cent to 63 percent in the corresponding period. 
Generally, between 1960 and 1966, the economic and political 
climate were quite stable, calculable and, hence, favourable to 
growth and capital formation (Emenuga 1996). Between 1967 and 
1970, investment and growth data on Nigeria were quite unreliable 
because of the civil war. For instance, data reported for 1967-69 did 
not include the Eastern region of the country. However, the war 
brought to fore the role of the Public sector in economic activity. 
Reported series for real GDP and GCF all declined. However, the 
                                                           
1 Most of the Figures quoted here and in the next section are from various 
editions of the FOS Digest of Statistics and Annual Abstract of Statistics. 
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private sector still averaged over 60 percent in investment 
expenditure over this period. 
 
     Many significant events before 1985 affected the economy and 
most especially investment spending, none more importantly than the 
management of oil revenues (Omoruyi 1995). The positive oil shocks 
of 1973/74 and 1979 multiplied the terms of trade more than five 
times between 1973-81 (World Bank, 1993). The spending of the oil 
revenue drove real per capita income in 1987 prices up from 1,300 
Naira in 1972 to nearly 2,900 Naira in 1980 (in current US$ of the 
time, from US$ 280 to US$ 1,100). The positive oil shocks generated 
massive savings and created investment booms. Investment 
expenditure when measured in current prices increased at an annual 
average rate of 53.0 percent between 1970 to 1975 period but the 
highest rate of growth was attained between 1974 and 1975 when 
capital formation reached a peak growth rate of 74.1 percent within a 
single year. The oil windfalls of the 1970s changed the sectoral 
composition of the GFCF in favour of the government. The 
government increased participation in the economy based on the 
believe that industrialisation is the engine of economic growth, and 
key to transforming the traditional economy. The view was made 
possible because government was the major beneficiary of the 
windfall. Various five-year development plans were drawn and they 
emphasised investment in large (state run) projects. 
 
     Since  1974,  the  public  sector had been controlling a higher 
proportion of GFCF. By 1976, the public sector controlled more than 
three times the share of private sector. As a share of the GDP, the 
private sector contributed less than an average of 3.0 percent in the 
1980s, as against an annual average of 8.8 percent in the period 
between 1973 and 1980 (see chart 2). The contribution even grew 
worse as the private sector could only contribute a paltry 0.2 percent 
of the GDP in 1993 in terms of investment-GDP ratio. 
 
          Most of the public sector investment had taken place in the 
industrial core projects (ICP) like Iron and Steel plants, Fertiliser 
plants, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and other projects. Like the 
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earlier years, building and construction continued to contribute the 
largest to GCF. By 1973, building and construction had attained a 
share of 72.7 percent of the GCF with a value of 4976.6 million in 
1984 Naira. This large shared was explained by the fact that there was 
the need for an extensive reconstruction of facilities damaged by the 
civil war and the implementation of the large construction 
programmes of the Federal Government, especially the construction 
of Federal Highways. The fall in oil revenue between 1980 and 1986 
left the economy with a highly capital intensive production structure 
that cannot pay for new, higher level of imports. Misallocation of 
resources in agriculture also included the construction, but not 
completion, of huge irrigation dams, which drew capital into 
agriculture, but produced few production benefits. In response to these 
distorted domestic terms of trade, the government engaged in fertiliser 
and interest rate subsidies. Market interest rates were pegged below 
their equilibrium rates. With further collapse in oil prices in 1986, the 
government adopted a far reaching economic reform programme 
which combined exchange rate and trade policy reforms aimed at 
revitalising the non oil economy with stabilisation policies designed 
to restore price stability and balance of payments equilibrium (see 
Emenuga 1996; Uchendu 1993). 
 
          Given the increasing share of public capital formation in total 
GFCF, the reforms were designed to emphasise downsizing the public 
sector and improving the efficiency of public asset management. 
Import licenses and the agricultural marketing boards were 
eliminated, price controls were lifted, and the deregulation of the 
financial system was initiated. The restructuring of domestic 
production and the liberalisation of the incentive regime led to a 
resurgence of agriculture and manufacturing, hence, real GDP started 
an upward journey again. The average nominal tariff level was 
lowered from 33 to 23 per cent, and the tariff structure was simplified. 
Most prices within the economy were decontrolled. 
 
     The immediate effect of these reforms was to restore the incentive 
to export and increase the profitability of private investment. 
Remarkable increases were recorded in investment (though largely 
public) in the last decade following the inauguration of an enabling 
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environment for investment. For instance, in 1988, the Federal 
Government issued an industrial policy statement outlying, among 
other things, a major liberalisation of the rules governing foreign 
participation in new enterprise in Nigeria with up to 100 percent 
permitted in most manufacturing activities. Besides, the Industrial 
Development Coordinating Committee (IDCC), an inter- ministerial 
body, was set up to become a one-stop approach centre for new 
ventures in order to reduce delays in receiving approvals for 
establishing an industry. 
Even so, the high inflation, high interest rates and persistent 
depreciation of the Naira exchange rate in the last few years could be 
described as having constituted serious disincentive to new private 
investment. (Omoruyi, 1995). 
 
3. Review of Relevant Literature. 
3.1.  The Traditional and New View on Investment. 
In the early literature on explaining aggregate investment, a 
distinction was made between explaining the desired capital stock 
and explaining the rate of investment (for a fuller discussion see 
Abel, 1980).  The early neoclassical investment theory of Jorgenson 
(1963) explains the desired capital stock as the outcome of a firms 
profit maximisation problem. Here, the desired capital stock is 
derived as a function of the demand for output and the rental cost of 
Capital. The adjustment from actual to desired Capital is specified as 
an ad hoc lagged adjustment. The Keynesian accelerator model, on 
the other hand, argues that the rate of investment spending is 
determined by the rate of change of output. Underlying this is the 
notion that the rate of change of output captures the expected future 
capacity requirements based on extrapolative expectations of past 
trends. 
Lucas (1967) and Treadway (1969), amongst others, modified the 
neoclassical investment theory by introducing the assumption that 
capital is costly to adjust. Hayashi (1982), following this literature, 
demonstrated the relationship between this approach and Tobin's q 
theory of investment. Tobin (1969) argues that aggregate investment 
spending on additional capital assets will vary positively with q - the 
ratio of the market value of business capital assets to the replacement 
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value of those assets. Tobin asserts that q can be used as a qualitative 
measure of the market's incentive to invest. If q is greater than unity, 
a favourable investment climate is indicated and investment spending 
is encouraged; conversely, a q well below unit discourages 
investment spending. 
Variables representing liquidity and finance constraints have, also, 
appeared frequently as determinants of business investment 
spending, especially in the short-run (Meyer and Kuh 1957). 
Chirinko and Schaller (1995) provide a good explanation of this 
"Cash flow" model. According to the cash flow model a firm first 
commits its retained earnings to financing its capital budget.  Only 
after internal cash flow is exhausted does the firm seek external debt 
or equity financing.  Since internal cash flow serves as a measure of 
profitability and as an index of the firm's capacity to attract external 
financing, the amount of the firm's investment is postulated to 
depend on its available cash flow. This is in contrast with the 
neoclassical theory of investment, as expressed by Keynes (1936) or 
Jorgenson (1963), which focuses on the net present value of the 
expected stream of returns from alternative uses of funds. Relevant 
variables include: the cost of a project; and expected future prices, 
costs and sales. In both developing and developed countries, 
accelerator effects have proved to be empirically important e.g. 
Greene and Villanueva, 1991). Within the neoclassical model these 
effects may be interpreted as reflecting the impact of current output 
growth on future expectations of demand. 
In general, the (flexible) accelerator, cash flow, neoclassical and 
Tobin's q models use directly output, cash flow, market value, prices 
and/or taxes as determinants of investment expenditures. A class of 
models is the time series/autoregressive models that regress 
investment on a series of previous investment expenditures. 
In recent years, a number of economists have argued that traditional 
rules for choosing the appropriate time to make investments ignore 
important costs.  Because these costs are not considered, the 
traditional rules advocate investing at a lower rate of return threshold 
than is optimal. The theory underlying these additional costs can be 
characterised as a "new" view of investment, (see Pindyck 1991; 
Metcalf and Rosenthal, 1995 among several writers who have 
brilliantly discuss these issues). 
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The basic idea is that when investments have the characteristics of 
irreversibly, uncertainty and flexibility then the new theory will 
suggest different investment strategies than the old theory. 
Irreversibility, in this context, means the existence of sunk costs (i.e. 
set up costs of investment that cannot be recouped if the piece of 
capital is later resold). An irreversible investment is permanent. It 
cannot be undone regardless of the return that ultimately is realised. 
Uncertainty refers to the possibility of different future returns from 
this investment. Because of uncertainty about future returns, the 
investment ex post may provide a low (possibly negative) rate of 
return. Flexibility means that investors have some choice about the 
timing of the investment. Flexibility in timing provides an 
opportunity to postpone the investment and see if more information 
comes along that helps in determining if the investment will provide 
a high rate of return ex post. 
Hence, the net present value of an investment project at time t may 
be positive, but if there is expected to be a flow of information in the 
course of period t+1, which reduces that uncertainty, then the 
optimum strategy could be to wait until some of this uncertainty is 
resolved. If the outcome turns out to be unfavourable, the investment 
project can then be abandoned. In other words, taking the option of 
waiting may be regarded as investing in information acquisition. 
Consequently, uncertainty may lead to the postponement of 
investment decisions rather than a straightforward abandonment of 
projects.  
 
3.2:  The Measures of Political Instability 
Campos and Nugent (2000) summarized the different measures of 
socio-political instability in the literature into two, namely: those that 
stresses regular and irregular government transfers, and those that are 
much harsher, such as revolutions, coups d'Etat, civil wars and 
political assassinations. In Mankiw’s (1995) study, political 
instability was measured by the frequency of revolutions, coups, or 
wars, and is negatively related to economic growth. Likewise, 
Persson and Tabellini (1999) measured Political instability by more 
frequent regime changes, or political unrest and violence, and this is 
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also significantly and negatively correlated with economic growth. 
Their study utilized a cross-country data.  
Barro and Lee (1993) in their study measured political instability by 
the numbers of political assassinations per million people, 
revolutions and successful coups d'Etat while Chen and Feng (1996) 
and Jaegger and Gurr, (1996) among others used measures such as 
competitiveness and regulation of political participation; regulation, 
competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment; and the 
legal (de jure) and operational (defacto) independence of the chief 
executive. Fosu (1992) included the concept of elite instability, 
which he defined as comprising for instance coup d’Etat as well as 
political plots, while  Berthélemy, Kauffmann, Renard and Wegner 
(2002) added some less dramatic events that are linked to social 
unrest like demonstrations and  political violence. In line with these 
studies, Campos and Nugent (2000) added that measures like strikes, 
demonstrations without violence or deaths, regional and internal 
conflicts, free press, etc., could also be used. Their study emphasized 
that these measures is capable of capturing the extent of even subtle 
changes in both legal and actual practice. This is given the fact that 
political actors and processes are to be subject to systematic 
regulation. The less regulated are such actors and processes, the 
greater is the potential for social and political change (and the higher 
the value of this socio-political instability index). 
Campos and Nugent (2000) also warned that there may be overlaps 
in these measures and these overlaps (including irregular government 
transfers) does little to diminish the different intensities that each 
attaches to “instability.” For instance while some measures constrain 
it to relatively tame phenomena, others places it closer to social 
chaos. In order to recognize both views, Campos and Nugent (2000) 
constructed two measures of socio-political instability, one capturing 
the more severe and the other the less severe forms of socio-political 
instability. Their measures of severe socio-political instability were 
similar to the measures used by Barro and Lee (1993) while those for 
moderate socio-political instability are similar to the measures used 
by Chen and Feng (1996) and Jaegger and Gurr (1996).  
 
3.3:  Political Institutions, Private Investment and Growth 
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Dixit and Pindyck (1993) shows that when one assumes that 
investments are irreversible, firms can be prompted to delay or 
forego investments out of the fear that the economic environment 
might change for the worse. For Stasavage (2000), irreversibility 
implies that downward adjustments in capital stock are more difficult 
to make than are upward adjustments. And as discussed by Serven 
(1998), in order to demonstrate a negative link between uncertainty 
and investment one needs to assume not only irreversibility but also 
either risk aversion, imperfect competition, or decreasing returns to 
scale. 
Most empirical studies in the literature on determinants of private 
investment provide support for the claim that higher uncertainty is 
associated with lower levels of private investment (see Stasavage 
(2000); Serven and Solimano (1993) and Serven (1998, 1997)). 
Stasavage (2000) mentioned that irreversible investments might be 
subject to a credibility problem whereby a government has an 
incentive to change taxes or regulations ex post with the knowledge 
that investors cannot easily withdraw. For instance, the well-known 
time-consistency problem in capital taxation exists even for 
governments, which are social welfare maximizers. A proposed 
solution to this problem is for voters to strategically delegate to an 
elected representative who has a greater share of her assets in the 
form of capital than does the median voter in society (Persson and 
Tabellini 1994). 
Furthermore, Stasavage (2000) warned that the credibility problem in 
investment is further complicated by the fact that firms are unlikely 
to have complete information about the preferences of any individual 
government decision maker. Instead, investors will have to make 
decisions based on their prior beliefs about these preferences. Under 
these conditions, the presence of political institutions characterized 
by multiple veto points (multiple decision makers in government) 
can help minimize credibility problems, to the extent that the greater 
the number of veto points, the higher the probability that at least one 
veto point will be controlled by an actor who, because of the assets 
they or their supporters own, will oppose ex post opportunistic 
changes in policy.  
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Stasavage (2000) defined a veto point2 as a political institution, the 
holder of which has the power to block a proposed change in policy. 
Multiple veto points can be created by constitutional provisions, 
which specify, for example, that multiple chambers of a legislature 
must approve any changes in laws. Multiple veto points can also 
exist as a consequence of electoral rules such as proportional 
representation, which favor the development of coalition 
governments. In coalition governments any one member of the 
coalition may be able to veto a policy proposal by threatening to 
withdraw from the government if its demands are not satisfied.  
Empirical studies suggest a significant negative correlation between 
political instability and economic growth (Barro, 1991, Alesina, 
Özler, Roubini and Swagel, 1996, Azam, Berthélemy and Calipel, 
1996). Guillaumont, Guillaumont and Brun (1999) goes even further, 
showing that political instability combined with trade instability are 
the main factors behind the poor economic performance of African 
countries on 1970-1990. 
Berthélemy, Kauffmann, Renard and Wegner (2002) stated that in a 
context of high instability, politicians tend to avoid structural reforms 
and lead wait-and-see policies instead in order to limit disagreement 
with the population and the other political parties. A government can 
also choose to pursue the same economic policy in spite of all the 
evidence, in order to defeat its opponents. Such schemes have been 
developed in the political economic literature by Alesina and 
Tabellini (1989), Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) and 
Ozler and Tabellini (1991). Following the same perspective, Clague, 
Keefer, Knack and Olson (1996) consider that short-term 
perspectives are not likely to help policy makers keep their 
commitments, while Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) and 
Terrones (1990) underline that a government threatened by 
instability may be tempted to use corruption to insure the loyalty of 
the bodies that might help it to remain in power like the police, the 
army, the administration. 
                                                           
2 See Tsebelis (1995) for a survey of political and electoral institutions, 
veto points, and their effect on policy making  
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The negative correlation between political instability and growth can 
be explained through impaired production factors accumulation and 
efficiency, as underlined by Fosu (1992) and Dixit and Pindick 
(1994). Instability prevents political institutions from ensuring 
property rights, which in turn increases the probability that returns on 
investment are expropriated. As a result of higher risk, less 
investment is undertaken. Fosu (1992) shows that the same applies to 
human capital accumulation, as political instability might cause brain 
drain. In extreme cases of instability like revolutions or coups d’état, 
Fosu (1992) argues that breaks in the production process might 
occur, reducing directly the level of GDP. Moreover, the impact on 
production-factor acumulation can also be accompanied by a 
negative influence on their productiviy Berthélemy, Kauffmann, 
Renard and Wegner (2002). 
More specifically, few empirical studies tackle the interaction 
between the economic and the political spheres at a global level, 
taking into account the correlation between political factors. Among 
those frameworks, Tavarès and Wacziarg (1997) and Poirson (1998) 
confirm the negative correlation between democracy and political 
instability. Barro (1991) and Özler and Rodrik (1992) disclose a 
significant and positive correlation between political freedom and 
economic performance. By contrast, Alesina and Perotti (1994) 
cannot highlight any impact of democracy on growth, while Barro 
(1996) suggests a non-linear relationship, too much and not enough 
democracy being harmful to growth.  
One possible reason for this is that democracy influences growth 
through numerous different channels, and these effects may have 
opposite signs (Stasavage, 2000). He stated that democracy might 
help to reduce uncertainty and raise private investment, but it also 
might generate increased pressures for redistribution, thus lowering 
allocative efficiency. Alesina and Perotti (1994) suggest another 
important reason for these inconclusive findings; dictatorships are a 
very heterogeneous group. Some authoritarian governments have 
pursued policies that promoted fast growth, some have tended 
towards kleptocracy while others, have at first been seen as models 
of stability, and subsequently, as prime examples of authoritarian 
misrule. In summary, Tavares and Wacziarg (1997) concluded that 
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the inconclusive impact of democracy on growth points towards an 
indirect influence. 
In contrast, some empirical studies on growth, find a more 
statistically significant link between levels of private investment and 
overall levels of democracy, for example, Serven (1997) who used 
the the Gastil index of civil liberties find it to be significantly 
correlated with private investment in a panel data estimation which 
controls for other investment determinants. One reason for this result 
may be that focusing on private investment as dependent variable 
excludes some of the negative effects which democracy might have 
on economic performance via increased demands for redistribution. 
Focusing on private investment rather than overall investment is also 
preferable when considering the effect of uncertainty, because 
Aizenman and Marion (1996) have shown that in cases where high 
uncertainty leads to a decline in private investment, public 
investment often increases in compensation. But Serven (1997) noted 
however, that it is unclear exactly what phenomenon the Gastil 
indices are capturing.  
Brunetti and Weder (1999) and Poirson (1998) both find that indices 
of the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, and corruption are 
significantly correlated with levels of private investment, controlling 
for other determinants. But Stasavage (2000) cautioned that though 
these findings have made a significant contribution to the literature, 
they have two shortcomings. First, indices such as the "rule of law" 
do not give any indication of which actual government institutions 
are associated with better provision of the rule of law. Second, 
measures of institutional quality may be subject to an endogeneity 
bias whereby their designers are influenced by overall economic 
performance in judging to what extent the rule of law, for example, is 
present.  
 
4. The Model. 
4.1. The  Core  Model
3
The first problem the researcher isolate is the fact that there are 
numerous factors that affects investment in theory. In fact, Levine 
                                                           
3 The aim of this paper is not to build a full investment model for Nigeria; 
hence other determinants of investment are ignored. 
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and Renelt (1992) argue that these factors are well over fifty. It will 
become difficult to impose a generous lag structure on the models (or 
even to enter all the potential determinants) since our sample period 
is small (1960-97) giving that we will be using annual data. This 
problem becomes serious in the process of uncovering the long run 
dynamic adjustment process. Second, there does not exist a 
consensus theoretical framework to guide works on investment. 
However, a common feature of most studies on investment 
regressions is that the explanatory variables are entered 
independently and linearly. Hence, our modelling approach is to start 
first with a theoretical model which we call the core model. The core 
model follows the neoclassical line of thought that investment 
spending is determined by two broad elements: the accelerator and 
the user cost of capital effects (see for example Ibarra, 1995). The 
accelerator effect captures the relationship between capital 
accumulation and the rate of change of output. The user cost captures 
the degree of substitutability between capital and other inputs. 
Using a two-factor model of investment behaviour in the tradition of 
the Neoclassical theory - capital and labour, the firm maximises 








Where γ is the efficiency parameter, ρ is the substitution parameter, 
and ν is the returns to scale parameter. The desired stock of capital 
that results from the first order conditions can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
  Κ* = A[Y]
φ[ωk/P]
-σ       ( 1 )  
 
where K* is the desired capital stock; Y is real output, ωk is the user 
cost of capital services, P is the output price, σ is the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour, φ is the elasticity of the 
optimal capital with respect to output, and A is a scale factor. The 
user cost of capital can be expressed as 
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  ωk = Pk [(r-π)/(1+π)+δ-κ-τz]/(1-τ)     (2) 
 
where  Pk is the purchase price of a unit of new capital; r is the 
nominal financial cost of capital, usually a weighted average of the 
external and internal cost of funds; π is the rate of inflation; δ is the 
rate of depreciation of the capital stock; τ is the rate of corporate 
income taxation; κ is the rate of investment tax credits; and z is the 
present value of tax depreciation allowances. 
Taking the differential of the logarithmic transformation of equation 
(1), and introducing costs of adjustment using a distributed lag 
function of the Koyck type, it is possible to get an expression that 
relates current investment to past investment, to rate of change of 
output and to the rate of change in the relative price of capital 
services. To transform these mathematical relations into an economic 
model of investment behaviour, it is the case that the actual rates of 
variation of output and the relative price of capital services are 
replaced by their expected counterparts. The result is the following 
equation: 
 
It/Kt-1 = κo + κ1[It-1/Kt-2] + κ2Et[∆ln(Yt)] +κ3Et[∆ln(ωkt/pt)] + εt  (3) 
  κ1, κ2 > 0; κ3 < 0. 
 
Subset of variables like political instability index can then be added to 
equation (3) Et[.] can be proxied by an autoregressive process. 
However, actual values will be used in this study. Yt will be measured 
by GDP. ωk will be measured using interest rate corresponding to the 
3-month Treasury Bills, the Gross Capital Formation Price index, the 
inflation rate corresponding to the CPI, and the corporate income tax 
rate. The rate of depreciation will still be assumed to be constant. The 
role of depreciation allowances and investment tax credits will still be 
ignored due to lack of information about these terms for Nigeria. 
However, it is unlikely that they might significantly alter the results. 
Denoting real output during time period t as Yt, and letting the fixed 
capital/output ratio equal µ, according to the accelerator model, not only 
does the optimal capital stock K
*




t  = µ. Y        ( 4 )  
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But the capital stock is always optimally adjusted in each time period, 
implying that K
* = Kt.
4 This formulation implies that the capital stock 
variable in equation (3) can be replaced by Y
5. This is important since 
we do not have reliable estimates of the capital stock for Nigeria. A 
more rigorous way of transforming similar models can be found in 
Berndt (1991). Our estimating core model is writing as: 
 
It/Yt-1 = αo + α1[It-1/Yt-2] + α2t[∆ln(Yt)] +α3t[∆ln(ωkt/pt)] + νt  (5) 
  α1, α2 > 0; α3 < 0. 
 
Lags of the independent variables will also be introduced in other to 
capture the dynamics involved in the determination of investment 
spending. However, because of the small sample size, we will favour 
the use of small lag lengths
6. The dynamic version of equation (5) 
would be estimated. Our sample period is 1960 to 1997. 
 
4.2. Empirics 
The Preferred dynamic version of our core model is presented in 
Table 1. We observed that private investment as a ratio of GDP is 
explained by it one period lag value, one period lagged accelerator 
effect and marginally by user cost. However the sign on the 
coefficient of user cost was observed to be positive as against 
theoretical expectations. The three exogenous variables explain about 
80 percent of the total variations in private investment share. The LM 
and ARCH tests (using 4 lags) do not show any significant evidence 
of serial correlation. The RESET test is used here as a proxy for test 
of (non-) linearity. We find no significant evidence that our linear 
specification is not adequate. The F-statistics is also found to be 
significant indicating a good overall fit. 
 
 
4 This restriction is relaxed in the so-called flexible accelerator model. However, the same 
conclusion is derivable therefrom. 
5 The parameter µ will be absorbed by the coefficients. 
 
6 The Time series properties of these series could be found in Busari and 
Fashanu (1998). 
  Busari,O.T.,Amaghionyeodiwe, L. Private Investment and Political Instability in Nigeria 
Table 1: OLS Estimate of the core Model 
Variable                   Coefficient      Std. Error   T-Statistic  Prob.   
     
C             .003524       0.006685        0.527216   0.6019 
INV_GDP(-1)        0.899828       0.079037          11.38486   0.0000 
DLNREAL_GDP(-1) 0.066175      0.032397         2.042658   0.0500 
COST           0.041604       0.026371         1.577636   0.1251 
______________________________________________________
  
R-squared  0.824489  Mean dependent var   0.072251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.806937 S.D. dependent var  0.043411 
S.E. of regression 0.019074 Akaike info criterion  -7.808675 
Sum squared resid  0.010915 Schwartz criterion  -7.629103 
Log likelihood   88.50357  F-statistic     46.97635 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.195505Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
Note: INV_GDP is the ratio of private investment to total GDP, 
DLNREAL_GDP is the first difference of the natural log of real GDP and 
COST is the first difference of the log of user cost of capital.  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic   0.852673  Probability     0.505057 
Obs*R-squared  3.942904  Probability     0.413788 
     
ARCH Test: 
F-statistic   0.141375  Probability     0.965141 
Obs*R-squared 0.663588  Probability     0.955742 
 
Ramsey RESET Test: 
F-statistic   2.045944  Probability     0.163299 
Log likelihood   2.317860  Probability     0.127896 
 
Based on our preferred dynamic model, we linearly append our 
measures of political uncertainty. First we explain how these 
measures were constructed and utilised. 
 
Constructing a Political Instability Index. 
In constructing our measures of political index, six primary series 
were gathered. These are occurrence of coup de tat (successful or 
not); war (the Nigerian civil war); political assassinations and extra-
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judicial executions; election crisis and violence; currency changes 
and the implementation of Firm nationalisation programmes (see 
Brunetti, and Weder 1997, among several authors that have followed 
this approach). For coup, we used actual number of occurrences. For 
the other variables we used a dummy, 1 for occurrence and zero 
elsewhere. Form these series, two major indices were then 
constructed. The first is a simple average of the sum of the various 
primary series and the second is the three period moving variance of 
the sum of the primary series.  
 
Table 2 OLS Estimate of Investment model Using Average value  
Variable    Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.  
C       0.010501   0.008612   1.219258
   0.2326 
INV_GDP(-1)    0.892832   0.078450   11.38091
   0.0000 
DLNREAL_GDP(-1)  0.062241   0.032226   1.931395
   0.0633 
COST    0.049134    0.026779    1.834784
   0.0768 
POL_AVG   -0.035370    0.027939  -1.265967
   0.2156 
_______________________________________________________
_       
R-squared    0.833680  Mean dependent var   
0.072251 
Adjusted R-squared  0.810740  S.D. dependent var   
0.043411 
S.E. of regression  0.018886  Akaike info criterion   -
7.803643 
Sum squared resid  0.010343  Schwartz criterion   -
7.579178 
Log likelihood     89.41802  F-statistic     
36.34071 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.234247  Prob(F-statistic)   0.000000 
Note: see note under Table 1. POL_AVG is the average value of our 
measures  of  political  instability.      
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From Table 2 we could observe that the coefficient on the cost of 
capital is significant but still positive. Our measure of political 
instability is not significant even at 10 per cent. However we 
observed that the coefficient is negative indicating the negative but 
insignificant impact of political instability on private investment in 
Nigeria. When we used the three-year moving variance of the sum of 
the various measures we observed a positive but insignificant impact 
of political instability on private investment. Further more our 
measure of the user cost of capital has a positive but insignificant 
coefficient. In sum, political instability seems to have an 
insignificant impact on private investment behaviour. It should be 
noted that we tested the individual series to see their impact on 
private investment spending but none was individually significant. 
The occurrence of coup and the nationalisation dummy were the only 
series with negative coefficients.  
 
 
Table 3 OLS Estimate of Investment model Using Variance of Sum  
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  T-Statistic   Prob.   
C            0.002627      0.006822          0.385076   0.7030 
INV_GDP(-1)         0.882048       0.082649      10.67217   0.0000 
DLNREAL_GDP(-1)  0.066643   0.032606      2.043882   0.0501 
COST            0.037912   0.026945       1.407011   0.1701 
POL_VAR          0.006972   0.008813        0.791080   0.4353 
_______________________________________________________
_ 
R-squared       0.828196  Mean dependent var   0.072251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.804499   S.D. dependent var   0.043411 
S.E. of regression    0.019195  Akaike info criterion  -7.771202 
Sum squared resid   0.010685  Schwartz criterion  -7.546737 
Log likelihood        88.86652  F-statistic                        34.94926 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.222213     Prob(F-statistic)             0.000000 
Note: see note under Table 1. POL_VAR is the three-year moving variance 




     The insignificant impact of our measures of political instability is 
taken to imply that uncertainty in macroeconomic framework seems 
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to be more important than political uncertainty in determining the 
behaviour of private investment. Stability in macroeconomic 
framework implies a stable exchange rate system, low expected rate 
of inflation etc.  The direct implication of this is that there seems to 
be more important factors outside political instability that drives 
private investment expenditure. Basically, the significance of the 
accelerator effect implies that policies that impair on aggregate 
domestic expenditure are likely to affect investment more than 
political instability. In effect, political instability can affect 
investment spending if it affects aggregate spending. The policy 
dimension to this is obvious. The political environment should be 
such that does not significantly affect the rate of change of domestic 
expenditure if private investment is to grow faster. Limitations 
relating to the data we used imply that above model must be treated 
with caution. Other approaches to constructing political series could 
also be an interesting area for further enquiry. 
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